Showing posts with label not quite cloud. Show all posts
Showing posts with label not quite cloud. Show all posts

Monday, August 31, 2009

My data centre is in your cloud, your cloud is in my data centre

Amazon announces VPC (EC2 instances on a private network) and this interesting article on ReadWrite about Zoho putting their SaaS offering behind the corporate firewall via vSphere (on what I assume is a VMWare).

Both solutions bring a piece of the cloud inside your environment and a first I was wondering if the connectivity or embedding increased security risks. I ran through the gamut of concerns such as:

  • Unknown vulnerabilities hidden in the stack
  • Immutable vulnerabilities in the solution that can't be patched
  • Malware/Malmachines

However, all of these can be addressed using existing controls we already deploy in our corporate environments, case in point:

"...and to extend their existing management capabilities such as security services, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems to include their AWS resources."

So now I've got IPS, internal firewalls (you have those right) and network anti-X to monitor and contain anything these external assets could throw at me. These controls are also useful if I choose to expose my pieces of the cloud to the outside world.

In reality though, Zoho's solution is just software-in-a-virtual-box based on popular software normally found in the cloud; while Amazon's VPC is just collocation with a point-to-point VPN (IBM and CGI have offered this forever, so does my employer for that matter). Most businesses are already comfortable with both of the former, so if the biggest objection to going Cloud is around governance, then maybe this is the compromise answer. If the biggest concern is data location, then this provides a nice compromise as well (keep the database inside the corporation).

Note the key assumptions for EC2 VPC integrity are:

  1. EC2 admins can't disengage the network isolation controls
  2. The network isolations control are some orthogonal mechanism that cannot be directly accessed from any EC2 instances (either inside or outside the VPC zone)
  3. The EC2 VPN endpoint is strictly bound to isolated network

I don't think these are unreasonable assumptions to make, not independently testable nor inviolable by any means but still reasonable.

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Where's my VMSafe for VMSafe?

VMWare continues to tease with VMSafe prototypes; while Reuven Cohen points out that vsphere isn't cloud computing (argue amongst yourselves about terms like "private cloud"), I like the idea of the ability to use the hypervisor to inspect the security state of the guest machines, but where's my API to confirm that the hypervisor is in a secure state?
VMsafe enables partners to build security solutions in the form of a virtual machine that can access, correlate and modify data to help control and protect: * Memory and CPU. VMsafe provides introspection of virtual machine memory pages and CPU states. * Networking. VMsafe enables filtering of network packets inside hypervisors,,as well as within the security virtual machine itself. * Process execution. VMsafe provided in-guest, in-process APIs that enable complete monitoring and control of process execution. * Storage. Guest virtual machine disk files can be mounted, manipulated and modified as they persist on storage devices.
If the API that provides my security tools the ability to look inside guest machines doesn't allow me to confirm that it's executing in a secure state, how can I trust the output from the API. It's the same old problem, if the someone shows up with a blue pill, any reliability assertion I can make from technology above is effectively meaningless. So really at the end of it all, I'm just going to have to make an assumption that the stack is secure driven by how much I trust the provider and the compensating controls on the underlying host (anti-X, ACL's etc...) knowing that there will always be (with current state tech) no way to defend against a nested VM attack were the true hypervisor is malicious. Speculation: Would full hardware virtualization solve this problem? Probably not unless it were completely locked in its behaviour (which would probably make it rather less than useful). I think the only way we're going to solve the nested VM security problem is a process outside of the virtualization stack, with a read-only monitoring port that can make assertions about the integrity of the virtualization stack (but that's just a WAG, I'm clearly no computer scientist). and now for a moment of pointless FUD: Here's a funny thought, if VMSafe allows me to inspect the "memory pages and CPU states" of a guest OS - does that mean I can get access to the encryption keys and other sensitive information inside the guest VMs?

IBM puts a WAF in the cloud?

IBM just announced a new cloud initiative around their Preventia and Rational platforms. The Rational play seems to meet the on-demand and scalability requirements of a cloud service (as many scans as you need for as many applications as you have) which puts them into the competitive space that contains solutions form Qualys and Cenzic among others. The Preventia platform leaves me a little fuzzy though, my first read on it is that it's a software appliance that you could put into your particular environment to protect your web app - same as you could incorporate a checkpoint software appliance into your cloud. So yes it adds security to web apps in the cloud, but it doesn't follow the same pattern as the "route through" solutions out there, so I don't think this isn't a cloud security service. Still, a start to addressing the security concerns of QSAs and CISSPs everywhere. (Best subtitle ever "Probably has a shiny uniform, catchphrase and secret handshake"). UPDATE: The Hoff of Rational Survivability is checking it out at RSA, thanks!